Exploiting Excessive Invariance caused by Norm-Bounded Adversarial
  Robustness by Jacobsen, Jörn-Henrik et al.
Accepted at the ICLR 2019 SafeML Workshop.
EXPLOITING EXCESSIVE INVARIANCE CAUSED BY
NORM-BOUNDED ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS
Jo¨rn-Henrik Jacobsen∗
Vector Institute and University of Toronto
Jens Behrmannn
University of Bremen
Nicholas Carlini
Google Brain
Florian Trame`r
Stanford University
Nicolas Papernot
Google Brain
ABSTRACT
Adversarial examples are malicious inputs crafted to cause a model to misclassify
them. Their most common instantiation, “perturbation-based” adversarial exam-
ples introduce changes to the input that leave its true label unchanged, yet result
in a different model prediction. Conversely, “invariance-based” adversarial exam-
ples insert changes to the input that leave the model’s prediction unaffected despite
the underlying input’s label having changed.
In this paper, we demonstrate that robustness to perturbation-based adversarial
examples is not only insufficient for general robustness, but worse, it can also
increase vulnerability of the model to invariance-based adversarial examples. In
addition to analytical constructions, we empirically study vision classifiers with
state-of-the-art robustness to perturbation-based adversaries constrained by an `p
norm. We mount attacks that exploit excessive model invariance in directions
relevant to the task, which are able to find adversarial examples within the `p ball.
In fact, we find that classifiers trained to be `p-norm robust are more vulnerable to
invariance-based adversarial examples than their undefended counterparts.
Excessive invariance is not limited to models trained to be robust to perturbation-
based `p-norm adversaries. In fact, we argue that the term adversarial example
is used to capture a series of model limitations, some of which may not have
been discovered yet. Accordingly, we call for a set of precise definitions that
taxonomize and address each of these shortcomings in learning.
1 INTRODUCTION
Research on adversarial examples is motivated by a spectrum of questions. These range from the se-
curity of models deployed in the presence of real-world adversaries to the need to capture limitations
of representations and their (in)ability to generalize (Gilmer et al., 2018a). The broadest accepted
definition of an adversarial example is “an input to a ML model that is intentionally designed by an
attacker to fool the model into producing an incorrect output” (Goodfellow & Papernot, 2017).
To enable concrete progress, many definitions of adversarial examples were introduced in the liter-
ature since their initial discovery (Szegedy et al., 2013; Biggio et al., 2013). In a majority of work,
adversarial examples are commonly formalized as adding a perturbation δ to some test example x
to obtain an input x∗ that produces an incorrect model outcome.1 We refer to this entire class of
malicious inputs as perturbation-based adversarial examples. The adversary’s capabilities may op-
tionally be constrained by placing a bound on the maximum perturbation δ added to the original
input (e.g., using an `p norm).
Achieving robustness to perturbation-based adversarial examples, in particular when they are con-
strained using `p norms, is often cast as a problem of learning a model that is uniformly continuous:
the defender wishes to prove that for all δ > 0 and for some ε > 0, all pairs of points (x, x∗) with
∗Correspondence to j.jacobsen@vectorinstitute.ai
1Here, an incorrect output either refers to the model returning any class different from the original source
class of the input, or a specific target class chosen by the adversary prior to searching for a perturbation.
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Figure 1: [Left]: When training a classifier without constraints, we may end up with a decision
boundary that is not robust to perturbation-based adversarial examples. [Right]: However, enforc-
ing robustness to norm-bounded perturbations, introduces erroneous invariance (dashed regions in
epsilon spheres). This excessive invariance of the perturbation-robust model in task-relevant direc-
tions may be exploited, as shown by the attack proposed in this paper.
‖x − x∗‖ ≤ ε satisfy ‖G(x) − G(x∗)‖ ≤ δ (where G denotes the classifier’s logits). Different
papers take different approaches to achieving this result, ranging from robust optimization (Madry
et al., 2017) to training models to have Lipschitz constants (Cisse et al., 2017) to models which are
provably robust to small `p perturbations (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018).
In this paper we present analytical results that show how optimizing for uniform continuity is not
only insufficient to address the lack of generalization identified through adversarial examples, but
also potentially harmful. Our intuition, captured in Figure 1, relies on the inability of `p-norms to
capture the geometry of ideal decision boundaries (or any other distance metric that does not per-
fectly capture semantics). This leads us to present analytical constructions and empirical evidence
that robustness to perturbation-based adversaries can increase the vulnerability of models to other
types of adversarial examples.
Our argument relies on the existence of invariance-based adversarial examples (Jacobsen et al.,
2019). Rather than perturbing the input to change the classifier’s output, they modify input semantics
while keeping the decision of the classifier identical. In other words, the vulnerability exploited by
invariance-based adversarial examples is a lack of sensitivity in directions relevant to the task: the
model’s consistent prediction does not reflect the change in the input’s true label.
Our analytical work exposes a complex relationship between perturbation-based and invariance-
based adversarial examples. We construct a model that is robust to perturbation-based adversarial
examples but not to invariance-based adversarial examples. We then demonstrate how an imperfect
model for the adversarial spheres task proposed by Gilmer et al. (2018b) is either vulnerable to
perturbation-based or invariance-based attacks—depending on whether the point attacked is on the
inner or outer sphere. Hence, at least these two types of adversarial examples are needed to fully
account for model failures (more vulnerabilities may be discovered at a later point).
To demonstrate the practicality of our argument, we then consider vision models with state-of-the-
art robustness to `p-norm adversaries. We introduce an algorithmic approach for finding invariance-
based adversarial examples. Our attacks are model-agnostic and generate `0 and `∞ invariance
adversarial examples, succeeding at changing the underlying classification (as determined by a hu-
man study) in 55% and 21% of cases, respectively. When `p-robust models classify the successful
attacks, they achieve under 58% (respectively, 5%) agreement with the human label.
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of our work is to show that different classes of current
classifier’s limitations fall under the same umbrella term of adversarial examples. Despite this com-
mon terminology, each of these limitations may stem from different shortcomings of learning that
have non-trivial relationships. To be clear, developing `p-norm perturbation-robust classifiers is a
useful benchmark task. However, as our paper demonstrates, it is not the only potential way classi-
fiers may make mistakes even within the `p norm. Hence, we argue that the community will benefit
from working with a series of definitions that precisely taxonomize adversarial examples.
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2 DEFINING PERTURBATION-BASED AND INVARIANCE-BASED
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In order to make precise statements about adversarial examples, we begin with two definitions.
Definition 1 (Perturbation-based Adversarial Examples). Let G denote the i-th layer, logit or
argmax of the classifier. A Perturbation-based adversarial example (or perturbation adversarial)
x∗ ∈ Rd corresponding to a legitimate test input x ∈ Rd fulfills:
(i) Created by adversary: x∗ ∈ Rd is created by an algorithm A : Rd → Rd with x 7→ x∗.
(ii) Perturbation of output: ‖G(x∗) −G(x)‖ > δ and O(x∗) = O(x), where perturbation δ > 0
is set by the adversary and O : Rd → {1, . . . , C} denotes the oracle.
Furthermore, x∗ is -bounded if ‖x− x∗‖ < , where ‖ · ‖ is a norm on Rd and  > 0.
Property (i) allows us to distinguish perturbation adversarial examples from points that are misclas-
sified by the model without adversarial intervention. Furthermore, the above definition incorporates
also adversarial perturbations designed for hidden features as in (Sabour et al., 2016), while usu-
ally the decision of the classifier D (argmax-operation on logits) is used as the perturbation target.
Our definition also identifies -bounded perturbation-based adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) as a specific case of unbounded perturbation-based adversarial examples. However, our anal-
ysis primarily considers the latter, which correspond to the threat model of a stronger adversary.
Definition 2 (Invariance-based Adversarial Examples). Let G denote the i-th layer, logit or argmax
of the classifier. An invariance-based adversarial example (or invariance adversarial) x∗ ∈ Rd
corresponding to a legitimate test input x ∈ Rd fulfills:
(i) Created by adversary: x∗ ∈ Rd is created by an algorithm A : Rd → Rd with x 7→ x∗.
(ii) Lies in pre-image of x under G: G(x∗) = G(x) and O(x) 6= O(x∗), where O : Rd →
{1, . . . , C} denotes the oracle.
As a consequence, D(x) = D(x∗) also holds for invariance-based adversarial examples, where
D is the output of the classifier. Intuitively, adversarial perturbations cause the output of the clas-
sifier to change, while the oracle would still label the new input x∗ in the original source class.
Whereas perturbation-based adversarial examples exploit the classifier’s excessive sensitivity in task-
irrelevant directions, invariance-based adversarial examples explore the classifier’s pre-image to
identify excessive invariance in task-relevant directions: its prediction is unchanged while the ora-
cle’s output differs. Briefly put, perturbation-based and invariance-based adversarial examples are
complementary failure modes of the learned classifier.
3 ROBUSTNESS TO PERTURBATION-BASED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES CAN
CAUSE INVARIANCE-BASED VULNERABILITIES
We now investigate the relationship between the two adversarial example definitions from Section 2.
So far, it has been unclear whether solving perturbation-based adversarial examples implies solving
invariance-based adversarial examples, and vice versa. In the following, we show that this relation-
ship is intricate and developing models robust in one of the two settings only would be insufficient.
In a general setting, invariance and stability can be uncoupled. For this consider a linear classifier
with matrix A. The perturbation-robustness is tightly related to forward stability (largest singular
value of A). On the other hand, the invariance-view relates to the stability of the inverse (smallest
singular value ofA) and to the null-space ofA. As largest and smallest singular values are uncoupled
for general matrices A, the relationship between both viewpoints is likely non-trivial in practice.
3.1 BUILDING OUR INTUITION WITH EXTREME UNIFORM CONTINUITY
In the extreme, a classifier achieving perfect uniform continuity would be a constant classifier. Let
D : Rn → [0, 1]C denote a classifier with D(x) = y∗ for all x ∈ Rd. As the classifier maps
3
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Figure 2: Robustness experiment on spheres with radii R1 = 1 and R2 = 1.3 and max-margin
classifier that does not see n = 10 dimensions of the d = 500 dimensional input. [Left]: Attacking
points from the outer sphere with perturbation-based attacks, with accuracy dropping when increas-
ing the upper bound on `2-norm perturbations. [Right]: Attacking points from the inner sphere with
invariance-based attacks, with accuracy dropping when increasing the upper bound on `2-norm per-
turbations. Each attack has a different effect on the manifold. Red arrows indicate the only possible
direction of attack for each sphere. Perturbation attacks fail on the inner sphere, while invariance
attacks fail on the outer sphere. Hence, both attacks are needed for a full account of model failures.
all inputs to the same output y∗, there exist no x∗, such that D(x) 6= D(x∗). Thus, the model is
trivially perturbation-robust (at the expense of decreased utility). On the other hand, the pre-image of
y∗ under D is the entire input space, thus D is arbitrarily vulnerable to invariance-based adversarial
examples. Because this toy model is a constant function over the input domain, no perturbation of
an initially correctly classified input can change its prediction.
This trivial model illustrates how one not only needs to control sensitivity but also invariance along-
side accuracy to obtain a robust model. Hence, we argue that the often-discussed tradeoff between
accuracy and robustness (see Tsipras et al. (2019) for a recent treatment) should in fact take into ac-
count at least three notions: accuracy, sensitivity, and invariance. This is depicted in Figure 1. In the
following, we present arguments as for why this insight can also extend to almost perfect classifiers.
3.2 COMPARING INVARIANCE-BASED AND PERTURBATION-BASED ROBUSTNESS
We now show how the analysis of perturbation-based and invariance-based adversarial examples can
uncover different model failures. To do so, we consider the synthetic adversarial spheres problem
of Gilmer et al. (2018b). The goal of this synthetic task is to distinguish points from two cocentric
spheres (class 1: ‖x‖2 = R1 and class 2: ‖x‖2 = R1) with different radii R1 and R2. The dataset
was designed such that a robust (max-margin) classifier can be formulated as:
D∗(x) = sign
(
‖x‖2 − R1 +R2
2
)
.
Our analysis considers a similar, but slightly sub-optimal classifier in order to study model failures
in a controlled setting:
D(x) = sign
(‖x1,...,d−n‖2 − b),
which computes the norm of x from its first d − n cartesian-coordinates and outputs -1 (resp. +1)
for the inner (resp. outer) sphere. The bias b is chosen based on finite training set (see Appendix A).
Even though this sub-optimal classifier reaches nearly 100% on finite test data, the model is imper-
fect in the presence of adversaries that operate on the manifold (i.e., produce adversarial examples
that remain on one of the two spheres but are misclassified). Most interestingly, the perturbation-
based and invariance-based approaches uncover different failures (see Appendix A for details on the
attacks):
• Perturbation-based: All points x from the outer sphere (i.e., ‖x‖2 = R2) can be perturbed
to x∗, whereO(x) = D(x) 6= D(x∗) while staying on the outer sphere (i.e., ‖x∗‖2 = R2).
• Invariance-based: All points x from the inner sphere (‖x‖2 = R1) can be perturbed to
x∗, where D(x) = D(x∗) 6= O(x∗), despite being in fact on the outer sphere after the
perturbation has been added (i.e., ‖x∗‖2 = R2).
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In Figure 2, we plot the mean accuracy over points sampled either from the inner or outer sphere,
as a function of the norm of the adversarial manipulation added to create perturbation-based and
invariance-based adversarial examples. This illustrates how the robustness regime differs signifi-
cantly between the two variants of adversarial examples. Therefore, by looking only at perturbation-
based (respectively invariance-based) adversarial examples, important model failures may be over-
looked. This is exacerbated when the data is sampled in an unbalanced fashion from the two spheres:
the inner sphere is robust to perturbation adversarial examples while the outer sphere is robust to in-
variance adversarial examples (for accurate models).
4 INVARIANCE-BASED ATTACKS IN PRACTICE
We now show that our argument is not limited to the analysis of synthetic tasks, and give practical
automated attack algorithms to generate invariance adversarial examples. We elect to study the
only dataset for which robustness is considered to be nearly solved under the `p norm threat model:
MNIST (Schott et al., 2019). We show that MNIST models trained to be robust to perturbation-
based adversarial examples are less robust to invariance-based adversarial examples. As a result,
we show that while perturbation adversarial examples may not exist within the `p ball around test
examples, adversarial examples still do exist within the `p ball around test examples.
Why MNIST? The MNIST dataset is typically a poor choice of dataset for studying adversarial
examples, and in particular defenses that are designed to mitigate them (Carlini et al., 2019). In
large part this is due to the fact that MNIST is significantly different from other vision classification
problems (e.g., features are quasi-binary and classes are well separated in most cases). However,
the simplicity of MNIST is why studying `p-norm adversarial examples was originally proposed as
a toy task to benchmark models (Goodfellow et al., 2015). Unexpectedly, it is perhaps much more
difficult than was originally expected. However, several years later, it is now argued that training
MNIST classifiers whose decision is constant in an `p-norm ball around their training data provides
robustness to adversarial examples (Schott et al., 2019; Madry et al., 2017; Wong & Kolter, 2018;
Raghunathan et al., 2018).
Furthermore, if defenses relying on the `p-norm threat model are going to perform well on a vision
task, MNIST is likely the best dataset to measure that—due to the specificities mentioned above.
In fact, MNIST is the only dataset for which robustness to adversarial examples is considered even
remotely close to being solved (Schott et al., 2019) and researchers working on (provable) robustness
to adversarial examples have moved on to other, larger vision datasets such as CIFAR-10 (Madry
et al., 2017; Wong et al., 2018) or ImageNet (Lecuyer et al., 2018; Cohen et al., 2019).
This section argues that, contrary to popular belief, MNIST is far from being solved. We show
why robustness to `p-norm perturbation-based adversaries is insufficient, even on MNIST, and why
defenses with unreasonably high uniform continuity can harm the performance of the classifier and
make it more vulnerable to other attacks exploiting this excessive invariance.
4.1 A TOY WORST-CASE: BINARIZED MNIST CLASSIFIER
Bin(x1) = Bin(x2)
Source Invariance 
O(x1) ≠ O(x2)
Source
Invariance
Bin(x2)
Bin(x1)
Figure 3: Invariance-based
adversarial example (top-left)
is labeled differently by a hu-
man than original (bottom-
left). However, both become
identical after binarization.
To give an initial constructive example, consider a MNIST classifier
which binarizes (by thresholding at, e.g., 0.5) all of its inputs before
classifying them with a neural network. As (Trame`r et al., 2018;
Schott et al., 2019) demonstrate, this binarizing classifier is highly
`∞-robust, because most perturbations in the pixel space do not
actually change the (thresholded) feature representation.
However, this binary classifier will have trivial invariance-based ad-
versarial examples. Figure 8 shows an example of this attack. Two
images which are dramatically different to a human (e.g., a digit of a
one and a digit of a four) can become identical after pre-processing
the images with a thresholding function at 0.5 (as examined by, e.g.,
Schott et al. (2019)).
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f-h)
Figure 4: Process for generating `0 invariant adversarial examples. From left to right: (a) the original
image of an 8; (b) the nearest training image (labeled as 3), before alignment; (c) the nearest training
image (still labeled as 3), after alignment; (d) the δ perturbation between the original and aligned
training example; (e) spectral clustering of the perturbation δ; and (f-h) possible invariance adver-
sarial examples, selected by applying subsets of clusters of δ to the original image. (f) is a failed
attempt at an invariance adversarial example. (g) is successful, but introduces a larger perturbation
than necessary (adding pixels to the bottom of the 3). (h) is successful and minimally perturbed.
4.2 GENERATING MODEL-AGNOSTIC INVARIANCE-BASED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In the following, we build on existing invariance-based attacks (Jacobsen et al., 2019; Behrmann
et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019) to propose a model-agnostic algorithm for crafting invariance-based
adversarial examples. That is, our attack algorithm generates invariance adversarial examples that
cause a human to change their classification, but where most models, not known by the attack algo-
rithm, will not change their classification. Our algorithm for generating invariance-based adversarial
examples is simple, albeit tailored to work specifically on datasets where comparing images in pixel
space is meaningful, like MNIST.
Begin with a source image, correctly classified by both the oracle evaluator (i.e., a human) and the
model. Next, try all possible affine transformations of training data points whose label is different
from the source image, and find the target training example which—once transformed—has the
smallest distance to the source image. Finally, construct an invariance-based adversarial example by
perturbing the source image to be “more similar” to the target image under the `p metric considered.
In Appendix B, we describe instantiations of this algorithm for the `0 and `∞ norms. Figure 4
visualizes the sub-steps for the `0 attack, which are described in details in Appendix B.
The underlying assumption of this attack is that small affine transformations are less likely to cause
an oracle classifier to change its label of the underlying digit than `p perturbations. In practice, we
validate this hypothesis with a human study in Section 4.3.
4.3 EVALUATION
Attack analysis. We generate 1000 adversarial examples using each of the two above approaches
on examples randomly drawn from the MNIST test set. Our attack is quite slow, with the alignment
process taking (amortized) several minutes per example. We performed no optimizations of this
process and expect it could be improved. The mean `0 distortion required is 25.9 (with a median of
25). The `∞ adversarial examples always use the full budget of 0.3 and take a similar amount of
time to generate; most of the cost is again dominated by finding the nearest test image.
Human Study. We randomly selected 100 examples from the MNIST test set and create 100
invariance-based adversarial examples under the `0 norm and `∞ norm, as described above. We then
conduct a human study to evaluate whether or not these invariance adversarial examples indeed are
successful, i.e., whether humans agree that the label has been changed despite the model’s prediction
remaining the same. We presented 40 human evaluators with these 100 images, half of which were
natural unmodified MNIST digits, and the remaining half were distributed randomly between `0 or
`∞ invariance adversarial examples.
Results. For the clean (unmodified) test images, 98 of the 100 examples were labeled correctly by
all human evaluators. The other 2 images were labeled correctly by over 90% of human evaluators.
Our `0 attack is highly effective: For 48 of the 100 examples at least 70% of human evaluator who
saw that digit assigned it the same label, different from the original test label. Humans only agreed
with the original test label (with the same 70% threshold) on 34 of the images, while they did not
form a consensus on the remaining 18 examples. The (much simpler) `∞ attack is less effective:
6
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Attack Type Success Rate
Clean Images 0%
`0 Attack 55%
`∞ Attack 21%
(a) Success rate of our invariance adversarial example
causing humans to switch their classification.
(b) Original test images (top) with our `0 (middle)
and `∞ (bottom) invariance adversarial examples.
(left) successful attacks; (right) failed attacks.
Figure 5: Our invariance-based adversarial examples. Humans (acting as the oracle) switch their
classification of the image from the original test label to a different label.
Fraction of examples where human and model agree
Model: Baseline ABS Binary-ABS `∞ PGD `2 PGD `0 Sparse
Clean 99% 99% 99% 99% 99% 99%
`0 54% 58% 47% 56%∗ 27%∗ 38%
`∞ 0% 0% 0% 0% 5%∗ 0%∗
Table 1: Models which are more robust to perturbation adversarial examples (such as those trained
with adversarial training) agree with humans less often on invariance-based adversarial examples.
Agreement between human oracle labels and labels by five models on clean (unmodified) examples
and our successful `0- and `∞-generated invariance adversarial examples. Values denoted with an
asterisks ∗ violate the perturbation threat model of the defense and should not be taken to be attacks.
When the model is wrong, it classified the input as the original label, and not the new oracle label.
Humans only agreed that the image changed label on 14 of the examples, and agreed the label had
not changed in 74 cases. We summarize results in Table 5 (a).
In Figure 5 (b) we show sample invariance adversarial examples. To simplify the analysis in the
following section, we split our generated invariance adversarial examples into two sets: the successes
and the failures, as determined by whether the plurality decision by humans was different than or
equal to the human label. We only evaluate the models on the subset of invariance adversarial
examples that caused the humans to switch their classification.
Model Evaluation. Now that we have oracle ground-truth labels for each of the images as decided
by the humans, we report how often our models agree with the human-assigned label. Table 1
summarizes the results of this analysis. For the invariance adversarial examples we report model
accuracy only on the successful attacks, that is, those where the human oracle label changed between
the original image and the modified image.
Every classifiers labeled all successful `∞ adversarial examples incorrectly (with one exception
where the `2 PGD-trained classifier Madry et al. (2017) labeled one of the invariance adversarial
examples correctly). Despite this fact, PGD adversarial training and Analysis by Synthesis Schott
et al. (2019) are two of the state-of-the-art `∞ perturbation-robust classifiers.
The situation is more complex for the `0-invariance adversarial examples. In this setting, the models
which achieve higher `0 perturbation-robustness result in lower accuracy on this new invariance test
set. For example, Bafna et al. (2018) develops a `0 perturbation-robust classifier that relies on the
sparse Fourier transform. This perturbation-robust classifier is substantially weaker to invariance
adversarial examples, getting only 38% accuracy compared to a baseline classifier’s 54% accuracy.
4.4 NATURAL IMAGES
While the previous discussion focused on synthetic (Adversarial Spheres) and simple tasks like
MNIST, similar phenomena may arise in natural images. In Figure 6, we show two different `2 per-
turbations of the original image (left). The perturbation of the middle image is nearly imperceptible
and thus the classifiers decision should be robust to such changes. On the other hand, the image on
7
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 6: Visualization that large `2 norms can also fail to measure semantic changes in images.
(a) original image in the ImageNet test set labeled as a tennis ball; (b) imperceptible perturbation,
`2 = 24.3; (c) semantic perturbation with a `2 perturbation of 23.2 that removes the tennis ball.
the right went through a semantic change (from tennis ball to a strawberry) and thus the classifier
should be sensitive to such changes (even though this case is ambiguous due to two objects in the
image). However, in terms of the `2 norm the change in the right image is even smaller than the im-
perceptible change in the middle. Hence, making the classifier robust within this `2 norm-ball will
make the classifier vulnerable to invariance-based adversarial examples like the semantic changes in
the right image.
5 CONCLUSION
Training models robust to perturbation-based adversarial examples should not be treated as equiva-
lent to learning models robust to all adversarial examples. While most of the research has focused
on perturbation-based adversarial examples that exploit excessive classifier sensitivity, we show that
the reverse viewpoint of excessive classifier invariance should also be taken into account when eval-
uating robustness. Furthermore, other unknown types of adversarial examples may exist: it remains
unclear whether or not the union of perturbation and invariance adversarial examples completely
captures the full space of evasion attacks.
Consequences for `p-norm evaluation. Our invariance-based attacks are able to find adversarial
examples within the `p ball on classifiers that were trained to be robust to `p-norm perturbation-
based adversaries. As a consequence of this analysis, researchers should carefully set the radii
of `p-balls when measuring robustness to norm-bounded perturbation-based adversarial examples.
Furthermore, setting a consistent radius across all of the data may be difficult: we find in our exper-
iments that some class pairs are more easily attacked than others by invariance-based adversaries.
Some recent defense proposals, which claim extremely high `0 and `∞ norm-bounded robustness,
are likely over-fitting to peculiarities of MNIST to deliver higher robustness to perturbation-based
adversaries. This may not actually be delivering classifiers matching the human oracle more often.
Indeed, another by-product of our study is to showcase the importance of human studies when the
true label of candidate adversarial inputs becomes ambiguous and cannot be inferred algorithmically.
Invariance. Our work confirms findings reported recently in that it surfaces the need for mitigat-
ing undesired invariance in classifiers. The cross-entropy loss as well as architectural elements such
as ReLU activation functions have been put forward as possible sources of excessive invariance (Ja-
cobsen et al., 2019; Behrmann et al., 2018). However, more work is needed to develop quantitative
metrics for invariance-based robustness. One promising architecture class to control invariance-
based robustness are invertible networks (Dinh et al., 2014) because, by construction, they cannot
build up any invariance until the final layer (Jacobsen et al., 2018; Behrmann et al., 2019).
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A DETAILS ABOUT ADVERSARIAL SPHERES EXPERIMENT
In this section, we provide details about the Adversarial Spheres (Gilmer et al., 2018b) experiment.
First, the bias b is chosen, such that the classifier D is the max-margin classifier on the (finite)
training set X (assuming separability: l ≤ u):
l = max
‖x‖2=R1,x∈T
‖x1,...,d−n‖2, u = min‖x‖2=R2,x∈T ‖x1,...,d−n‖2, b = l +
u− l
2
.
Second, the attacks are designed such that the adversarial examples x∗ stay on the data manifold
(two concentric spheres). In particular, following steps are taken:
Perturbation-based: All points x from the outer sphere (i.e., ‖x‖2 = R2) can be perturbed to x∗,
where O(x) = D(x) 6= D(x∗), while staying on the outer sphere (i.e., ‖x∗‖2 = R2) via following
steps:
1. Perturbation of decision: x∗1,...,d−n = a (x1,...,d−n), where scaling a > 0 is chosen such
that ‖x∗1,...,d−n‖2 < b
2. Projection to outer sphere: x∗d−n,...,d = c (xd−n,...,d), where scaling c > 0 is chosen such
that ‖x∗d−n,...,d‖2 =
√
R22 − ‖x∗1,...,d−n‖22
For points x from the inner sphere, this is not possible if b > R1.
Invariance-based: All points x from the inner sphere (‖x‖2 = R1) can be perturbed to x∗, where
D(x) = D(x∗) 6= O(x∗), despite being in fact on the outer sphere after the perturbation has been
added (i.e., ‖x∗‖2 = R2) via following steps:
1. Fixing the used dimensions: x∗1,...,d−n = x1,...,d−n
2. Perturbation of unused dimensions: x∗d−n,...,d = a (xd−n,...,d), where scaling a > 0 is
chosen such that ‖x∗d−n,...,d‖2 =
√
R22 − ‖x∗1,...,d−n‖22
For points x from the outer sphere, this is not possible if b > R1.
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B DETAILS ABOUT MODEL-AGNOSTIC INVARIANCE-BASED ATTACKS
Here, we give details about our model-agnostic invariance-based adversarial attacks on MNIST.
Generating `0-invariant adversarial examples. Assume we are given a training set X consisting
of labeled example pairs (x, y). As input our algorithm accepts an example xˆ with oracle label
O(xˆ) = yˆ. Image xˆ with label yˆ = 8 is given in Figure 4 (a).
Define S = {x : (x, y) ∈ X , y 6= yˆ}, the set of training examples with a different label. Now we
define T to be the set of transformations that we allow: rotations by up to 20 degrees, horizontal or
vertical shifts by up to 6 pixels (out of 28), shears by up to 20%, and re-sizing by up to 50%.
Now, we generate the new augmented training set X ∗ = {(t(x), y, t) : t ∈ T , (x, y) ∈ X}. By
assumption, each of these examples is labeled correctly by the oracle. In our experiments, we verify
the validity of this assumption through a human study and omit any candidate adversarial example
that violates this assumption. Finally, we search for
x∗, y∗, t = arg min
(x∗,y∗,t)∈§∗
‖x∗ − xˆ‖0.
By construction, we know that xˆ and x∗ are similar in pixel space but have a different label. Figure 4
(b-c) show this step of the process. Next, we introduce a number of refinements to make x∗ be “more
similar” to xˆ. This reduces the `0 distortion introduced to create an invariance-based adversarial
example—compared to directly returning x∗ as the adversarial example.
First, we define δ = |xˆ − x∗| > 0.5 where the absolute value and comparison operator are taken
element-wise. Intuitively, δ represents the pixels that substantially change between x∗ and xˆ. We
choose 0.5 as an arbitrary threshold representing how much a pixel changes before we consider the
change “important”. This step is shown in Figure 4 (d). Along with δ containing the useful changes
that are responsible for changing the oracle class label of xˆ, it also contains irrelevant changes that
are superficial and do not contribute to changing the oracle class label. For example, in Figure 4
(d) notice that the green cluster is the only semantically important change; both the red and blue
changes are not necessary.
To identify and remove the superficial changes, we perform spectral clustering on δ. We compute
δi by enumerating all possible subsets of clusters of pixel regions. This gives us many possible
potential adversarial examples x∗i = xˆ + δi. Notice these are only potential because we may not
actually have applied the necessary change that actually changes the class label.
We show three of the eight possible candidates in Figure 4. In order to alleviate the need for hu-
man inspection of each candidate x∗i to determine which of these potential adversarial examples is
actually misclassified, we follow an approach from Defense-GAN Samangouei et al. (2018) and the
Robust Manifold Defense Ilyas et al. (2017): we take the generator from a GAN and use it to assign
a likelihood score to the image. We make one small refinement, and use an AC-GAN Mirza &
Osindero (2014) and compute the class-conditional likelihood of this image occurring. This process
reduces `0 distortion by 50% on average.
As a small refinement, we find that initially filtering X by 20% least-canonical examples makes the
attack succeed more often.
Generating `∞-invariant adversarial examples. Our approach for generating `∞-invariant ex-
amples follows similar ideas as for the `0 case, but is conceptually simpler as the perturbation budget
can be applied independently for each pixel (as we will see, our `∞ attack is however less effective
than the `0 one, so further optimizations may prove useful).
We build an augmented training set X ∗ as in the `0 case. Instead of looking for the closest
nearest neighbor for some example xˆ with label O(xˆ) = yˆ, we restrict our search to examples
(x∗, y∗, t) ∈ X ∗ with specific target labels y∗, which we’ve empirically found to produce more
convincing examples (e.g., we always match digits representing a 1, with a target digit represent-
ing either a 7 or a 4). We then simply apply an `∞-bounded perturbation (with  = 0.3) to xˆ by
interpolating with x∗, so as to minimize the distance between xˆ and the chosen target example x∗.
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C INVARIANCE-BASED ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES FOR BINARIZED MNIST
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Figure 7: Histogram of MNIST pixel values (note the log scale on the y-axis) with two modes around
0 and 1. Hence, binarizing inputs to a MNIST model does not impact its performance importantly.
Figure 8: Invariance-based adversarial examples for a toy `∞-robust model on MNIST. By thresh-
olding inputs, the model is robust to perturbations δ such that ‖δ‖∞ . 0.5. Adversarial examples
(top-right of each set of 4 images) are labeled differently by a human. However, they become iden-
tical after binarization; the model thus labels both images confidently in the source image’s class.
D COMPLETE SET OF 100 INVARIANCE ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Below we give the 100 randomly-selected test images along with the invariance adversarial examples
that were shown during the human study.
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D.1 ORIGINAL IMAGES
D.2 `0 INVARIANCE ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
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D.3 `∞ INVARIANCE ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
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